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The prominent honor systems at our nation’s colleges and universities have
evolved significantly since their origin. While chronicling the honor system at
the United States Military Academy at West Point, Lewis Sorley wrote in Honor
Bright, “[a]s in any system or proceeding in which values in conflict are
mediated, some desirable attributes are given up or attenuated in order to attain
others.” 1 He speaks, of course, about the increased focus on the due process
rights of students who attend a school with such a revered honor system. Indeed,
these institutions have attempted to correct both the Fifth and Fourteen
Amendment honor system deficiencies that may have existed in earlier years by
injecting legal-oriented processes aimed squarely at protecting those rights. 2
Sorley continues, “two aspects [of the modern West Point honor system] stand
out: swiftness has given way to what many might view as ponderousness, or at
least burdensome and time-consuming process; and helplessness of the accused
has been replaced by a robust set of rights, rules, procedures, representation, and
appellate judgment (Superintendent’s discretion).” 3
The second of those attributes is undeniably a noble goal: educational
institutions with austere but respected honor codes take measures to align their
honor systems with the due process requirements of the Constitution and as they
move away from previous practices when due process protections in the systems
were more often subordinated. 4 Despite how noble that goal is, however, the
shift to more due process protection has precipitated undesired results that
frustrate both the intent and spirit of the codes, as well as infringe upon other
aspects of individual liberty. 5 Further, some have observed a correlating shift
from student focus on compliance with honor codes to a fixation on exoneration,
given the increased opportunity for fighting and defeating honor allegations
using legal recourses. 6 While more process undeniably ensures more protection
of students’ rights, it also deprives the accused of a swift resolution, a less than
desired outcome for all parties involved. 7
This article proposes that there has been an “overcorrection” of due process
in college and university honor systems such that there is now simply too much
process. More importantly, this article urges educational institutions to take a
close look at their honor processes to detect and excise such procedural excesses.
While this article does not endeavor to identify the specific processes where
scale-backs could be made, it reviews relevant case history and suggests schools
1. LEWIS SORLEY, HONOR BRIGHT: HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF THE WEST POINT HONOR
CODE AND SYSTEM 143 (McGraw-Hill Learning Sols. 2009).
2. Id. at 114–15.
3. Id. at 143.
4. Id. at 114.
5. See id. at 140, 143.
6. LANCE BETROS, CARVED FROM GRANITE: WEST POINT SINCE 1902 297 (Tex. A&M
Univ. Press, 2012).
7. SORLEY, supra note 1, at 143.
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have latitude to reverse the trend of over-legalized honor systems. Further, this
article considers how the negative byproducts of these over-processed honor
systems conflict with the purpose of their underlying codes. These trends of
continually adding legal protections to our schools’ honor systems will only
escalate in our increasingly litigious society. For these reasons, this article is a
clarion call for institutional introspection and change: the time is nigh for
reversing course and ensuring honor systems are legally efficient rather than
legally oversaturated.
I. HONOR CODES: TRADITION, PURPOSE, AND CHANGE
A. Tradition: To Ourselves and Our Posterity
Certain schools are particularly well-known for their honor codes. These
institutions include the College of William and Mary, Brigham Young
University, and the University of Virginia. 8 Of course, such discussions will
also likely include the honor systems at our nation’s service academies and
senior military colleges such as the United States Military Academy, the United
States Naval Academy, the United States Air Force Academy in the Virginia
Military Institute, and the Citadel. 9 Virtually all of the renowned honor codes
at these schools champion tradition as a key pillar of their endurance. 10 The
traditional argument, as these schools may contend,, is that their institution’s
prestige is largely derived from the longevity of their unbending honor codes.
B. Purpose: To Bind by Oath or Affirmation
While there may not be a universal aim or goal of these institutions, one
purpose of honor codes is to provide the schools with a mechanism to ensure a

8. See, e.g., Rudy Abramson, A Matter of Honor: Cheating. Lying. Stealing. With these Kind
of Scandals Dogging College Campuses, it Would Seem Integrity has Fallen from Favor. But in
Reality, Codes of Conduct are on the Rise—And It’s Often the Students who are Pushing Them,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 3, 1994, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1994-04-03-vw41646-story.html; Samuel T. Jay, A Higher Power Produces Greater Problems: How Religious
Honor Codes and Religious Schools Exacerbate Campus Sexual Assault, 25 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POLY & L. 179, 185–86 (2017).
9. See Abramson, supra note 8.
10. See, e.g., The Honor Code & Honor Councils, COLL. OF WILLIAM & MARY, https://www.
wm.edu/offices/deanofstudents/services/communityvalues/honorcodeandcouncils/honorcode/inde
x.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) (“Among the most significant traditions of William & Mary is its
student-administered honor system. The essence of the honor system is individual responsibility.
We entrust students to maintain the Code and adjudicate matters involving alleged violations of the
Code. The Honor Code is an enduring tradition at the University with documented history that
originates as far back as 1736. Today, students administer the Honor pledge to each incoming
student and educate faculty and administration on the relevance of the Code and its application to
students’ lives at the University. Students administer the Code through six Honor Councils and the
Council of Chairs.”).
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minimum standard of ethical behavior within their student bodies. 11 Another
could be to ensure graduates of these institutions have inculcated a baseline code
of ethics for their postgraduate entry into professions that value those
attributes. 12 Yet another purpose is to simply prolong a virtuous historical
characteristic of the institution which, in theory, will fuel esprit de corps to help
drive honorable compliance. This, in turn, will help facilitate the two previously
mentioned purposes. 13 Whatever the intent of these systems, universities and
colleges with active and noteworthy honor codes are few and far between.
Recently, however, honor codes have been introduced at schools that do not
lack for academic prestige but have never had an honor code. Harvard and
Columbia are two such examples. 14 The impetus for these additions is born from
a concern about declining academic integrity within the schools’ student bodies,
and the associated worry that such erosion of honor will harm the schools’
credibility and reputation. 15
An obvious starting point for the newcomers on the honor code scene is to
look to those institutions for well-established honor systems for tried and true
blueprints. However, the notion that such historic institutions, such as our
service academies and the University of Virginia, have long-standing and
unaltered honor systems is somewhat of a fallacy. While the honor codes at
these schools may indeed have remained unchanged for scores of years, the
honor systems that facilitate the codes are an uber-evolving product that must
confront the changing contemporary views about integrity and the advent of new
technology. 16 Perhaps, more importantly, these evolutions are fueled by the
noble goal of building a more perfect and more fair system for all stakeholders.
C. Change: To Form a More Perfect Honor System
It is this last goal that perhaps catalyzes the most change, and turbulence,
within the honor systems at colleges and universities. These revisions, though
noble, sometimes exacerbate the tensions between the often competing goals of
(1) doing what is effective and efficient and (2) doing what is fair and just from
the perspective of both the institutions and the students they serve. Ironically,
the exact same goals for both stakeholders creates the most friction.
11. See, e.g., The Honor System, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. L., https://www.law.virginia.edu/
academics/honor-system (last visited Apr. 5, 2020).
12. See, e.g., About West Point, U.S. MIL. ACAD. W. POINT, https://www.westpoint.edu/about
(last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (setting forth as part of the West Point Military Academy’s mission
character and honor components to prepare its graduates for professional and career excellence).
13. See, e.g., The Honor Code & Honor Councils, COLL. OF WILLIAM & MARY,
https://www.wm.edu/offices/deanofstudents/services/communityvalues/honorcodeandcouncils/ho
norcode/index.php (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (referring to the honor code as “[a]mong the most
significant traditions of William & Mary” and an “enduring tradition”).
14. Sam Goldman, The Problem with Honor Codes, MINDING THE CAMPUS (May 8, 2014),
https://www.mindingthecampus.org/2014/05/08/the_problem_with_honor_codes/.
15. Id.
16. See id.; see also SORLEY, supra note 1, at 147.
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Presumably, one way to strike the right balance with these goals is to ensure
these honor systems, whose stakeholders indeed have much at stake, are legally
sound. An easy metric for such validation is to ensure the systems are
impervious to challenges in court. The legal issues involved with court
challenges of honor systems usually surround the property and liberty rights
associated with the Fifth and Fourteen Amendments, and the corresponding
process required to protect these rights. 17 Unsurprisingly, the honor systems of
today include much more in the way of legal processes and constitutional
protections than the honor systems of yesterday. 18 Not only do these protections
help make the honor systems litigation-proof, they also aim to ensure that these
systems, which are primarily run by students, do not revert to the in-house,
frontier-justice practices of yesteryear when the students administering the
systems were unchecked by institutional control measures.. 19
II. THE ISSUE
A. Unintended Consequences: Judiciary, the Least Dangerous Branch?
Along with the desired byproducts of the well-intended legal development of
honor systems come unintended consequences. Such consequences include
procedures or by-laws that are lengthy, complex, and, as a result, not universally
known or comprehended by the student bodies they serve. 20 Further, and
perhaps most concerning, these unwieldly rulebooks often yield more lengthy
processes measured from the discovery of the alleged honor infraction until the
issue’s final resolution. 21 The prolonged sagas of students living under a cloud
of suspicion as they await resolution of a protracted honor investigation are an
undesirable byproduct of these well-developed systems. 22 Indeed, the far-fromswift justice that results from adhering to arduous legal processes also negatively
impacts both the schools and individuals involved. Ironically, the development
of these more perfect and legally sound systems often results in less efficient,
less effective, and, by extension, less fair systems because of the time it takes to
navigate them.

17. See, e.g., Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. Va., 719 F.2d 69, 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1983)
(challenge to a state school’s honor system, implicating the Fourteenth Amendment); Andrews v.
Knowlton, 509 F.2d 898, 900–03 (2d Cir. 1975) (challenge to a federally operated school’s honor
system, implicating the Fifth Amendment).
18. See SORLEY, supra note 1, at 142–43.
19. Id. (referring at one point to the erstwhile tradition of “silenc[ing]” a cadet-organic en
masse tactic of avoiding communication with a cadet previously found guilty of an honor violation
but allowed to remain at the Academy due to administrative, political, or judicial intervention).
20. See UNIV. OF VA., Honor Audit Commission: 2017–2018 Report 11 (2018),
https://honor.virginia.edu/sites/honor.virginia.edu/files/HAC%20Report_Final.pdf (last visited
Apr. 5, 2020) (discussing results from University of Virginia’s Honor Audit Commission).
21. See id. at 19–20 (discussing the case process).
22. Id.
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This conundrum poses some tough questions. Have these educational honor
systems gone too far by inserting legal processes into honor systems otherwise
designed to be administrative and academic rather than litigious and adversarial?
Does the time and resources required by a methodical legal process result in a
less efficient and effective system? Most importantly, and in line with the theme
of this article, can a less legally burdensome system exist while at the same time
satisfying constitutional due process requisites?
B. The Time for Introspection: When in the Course of Human Events . . .
The goal of this article is not to parse the by-laws of the various honor systems
in order to point out the exact areas where legal processes may be truncated.
Rather, it is to posit theories based on case precedent that illustrate how
institutions of higher education have the latitude to make such adjustments. The
time to do so is now. The argument falls into three major categories and
generally outlines the structure of this article.
First, this article explores the somewhat tenuous nature of whether due
process property rights are in fact triggered when a school’s honor system
decision affects a student’s enrollment status. Identifying the interests at stake
when administering a system that could ultimately lead to a student’s dismissal
from the institution helps determine whether the due process clause is even
applicable. If due process rights are implicated, further examination will help
determine what processes courts have required from a procedural standpoint. It
is enlightening to look at court cases that consider these issues from the
perspective of both the educational institutions, in general, and their honor
systems, in particular. The case law that accompanies this discussion reviews
the rights and processes at play when a school’s honor system faces a
constitutional challenge.
Second, this article suggests a renewed emphasis on the nature of the
institution’s interest within the balance of rights between the individual and
institution. A review of relevant case law introduces the legal test courts often
apply to evaluate whether an honor process passes constitutional muster. While
the focus of these legal disputes often centers on the right of the individual, one
of the reviewed cases cautions against the tendency to neglect and subordinate
the school’s interests to that of the student. With the Mathew decision in mind,
this article will point out how the due process “test” articulated by Mathew, the
landmark case, for balancing interests affords the schools flexibility to
streamline their honor system legal processes.
Finally, this article identifies the largely contractual nature between the
student and the educational institution vis a vis the schools’ honor systems. This
contractual flavor is particularly prevalent at those institutions with wellestablished honor systems. As a general matter, contractual challenges attract
less procedural and substantive judicial scrutiny in court than due process cases
without a contractual nexus. Noting that the honor systems at some of the most
prestigious schools include a form of contract between the school and its
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students, this article posits that refocusing the defense of honor system
challenges through the prism of contract would more often be favorable to the
school. This refocus, in turn, yields more space for the schools to move towards
more legal efficiency within their honor processes.
Much has been written about the question of due process rights in education,
particularly with respect to a student’s rights when faced with potential academic
or disciplinary dismissal. 23 Indeed, the issue is robust with debate since it deals
with basic constitutional rights of the students and their alignment with the goals,
honor, and prestige of the colleges and universities. Courts have struggled to
more clearly define both the existence of those students’ rights and the process
required to protect them. 24 Section one of this articles’ three sections described
above includes a summary of the due process rights at play. A survey of the
honor system challenges in court speaks to the required processes and balance
of interests discussed in section two. Finally, a closer look at selected schools’
honor procedures and their desired outcomes fills out the third section.
Before attempting to answer any of these questions, a short comparative
survey of several noteworthy honor systems is in order. Though many honor
systems are worthy of review, this article primarily focuses on the honor systems
at the University of Virginia and the United States Military Academy at West
Point.
III. A TALE OF TWO HONOR CODES
Some of the most well-known honor systems in the United States are those at
our nation’s service academies, senior military colleges, and several colleges
and universities nationwide. Some of the oldest and most revered honor systems
among those are found at the University of Virginia, the College of William and
Mary, the Virginia Military Institute, and the United States Military Academy at
West Point.
Thus, a discussion about due process in honor systems would naturally focus
on these schools. Their honor systems have stood the test of time by both
keeping true to their core principals yet evolving in the interest of improving
their processes. 25 To be sure, austerity is the watchword in such honor systems.
However, many of the recent changes are implemented in the interest of making
23. Fernand N. Dutile, Students and Due Process in Higher Education: Of Interests and
Procedures, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 243 (2001).
24. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
25. See UNIV. OF VA., Honor Committee By-laws (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://honor.virginia.edu/sites/honor.virginia.edu/files/Honor%20Committee%20Bylaws%20February%2024%202020.pdf. The purpose statement of the by-laws indicates the process
operates within the parameters of “fundamental fairness:”
Purpose: The Honor Committee is the body responsible for the administration of the
Honor System. In discharging this function, the Committee’s principal purpose is to
maintain the Community of Trust on which the Honor System rests within a framework
of fundamental fairness to students involved in Honor proceedings. Id.
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more fair systems while staying true to the unyielding principles. A quick survey
of the honor systems at the United States Military Academy and the University
of Virginia illustrate these points.
A brief scan of the most recent revisions of the honor system procedures at
West Point and the University of Virginia is quite revealing. For what may seem
like straightforward codified dictates to not lie, cheat, or steal in systems that are
either “single sanction,” or that keep the remedy of expulsion as a very real
option amongst a menu of other less severe sanctions, the rule books are quite
lengthy. 26 The “By-Laws” of the University of Virginia’s honor system is fortynine pages long, whereas the pamphlet outlining the procedures of the cadet
honor code at West Point has grown in recent years to ninety-one pages. 27 With
such straightforward expectations, both rulebooks seem longer than one might
presume they would be. However, the procedure manual for West Point’s honor
system is conspicuously twice as long as its fellow renowned system at the
University of Virginia.
Further inspection of the two systems bring out a contrast starker and more
substantive than page-count differences. While the processes afforded students
accused of honor violations in the University of Virginia’s honor system rules
appear more subtly designed to protect those students’ due process rights, the
procedures of the West Point honor system are unabashedly legalistic. 28 For
example, the root word “law” is used twice in Virginia’s rules but is used sixteen
times in West Point’s. 29 The root word “legal” is used four times in Virginia’s,
but fifty-eight times in West Point’s. 30 The word “attorney” is absent from
Virginia’s By-Laws but is used five times in West Point’s procedures. 31 Finally,
the word “rights” is used five times in Virginia’s By-Laws and sixty-five times
in West Point’s procedures. 32
This is not to say the University of Virginia or other institutions mentioned
are abandoning constitutional rights and protections in its by-laws. To be sure,
the Virginia By-Laws include plentiful legal-tinged processes and protections,
as evidenced by the word “counsel” showing up twenty-one times more in the
Virginia rules than it does in West Point’s. 33 This reference to counsel describes
the advocacy—albeit not from an actual, practicing lawyer—to which a

26. See U.S. CORPS OF CADETS, Pamphlet 15–1, The Cadet Honor Code, System, and
Committee Procedures (Oct. 1, 2018) (documenting rules and process for United States Military
Academy Honor System) (document on file with author); see UNIV. OF VA., supra note 25
(documenting rules and process for University of Virginia Honor System).
27. See sources cited supra note 26.
28. See sources cited supra note 26.
29. See sources cited supra note 26.
30. See sources cited supra note 26
31. See sources cited supra note 26.
32. See sources cited supra note 26.
33. See U.S. CORPS OF CADETS, Pamphlet 15–1, supra note 26.
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University of Virginia student is entitled during the hearings. 34 Thus, a
comparison of certain terminology exposes the legal bedrocks of University of
Virginia’s honor system and shows how West Point is not the only school that
has embedded due process components into its honor system processes. Indeed,
most honor systems have, throughout the years, adjusted their rules to ensure
they comport with constitutional requirements in order to maintain both the legal
and moral high ground, but also to achieve the practical goal of being litigationproof. Thus, since both institutions have their fair share of legal terminology
and process embedded in their honor systems, the better question may be to
assess whether so much legalese is necessary for either of them.
Regardless of whether the honor system procedures are riddled with legal
terminology—West Point for example—or cloaked with less conspicuous lingo
to protect constitutional rights—as is the case with the University of Virginia—
it is worth asking whether these honor systems at educational institutions have
gone too far in terms of infusing legal procedures into what are intended to be
administrative processes rather than criminal trials. Sometimes forgotten in
these conversations is that, when a school presents its graduates with diplomas,
it is certifying that the student meets all qualifications to earn a degree from the
institution, to include confirmation that the student lived honorably under the
standards of the school’s honor codes and, by extension, will similarly do so in
their professions and in society.
However, have the efforts by institutions of higher educations to make their
honor systems litigation proof decreased these systems’ efficiency in the form
of increased time to resolve honor allegations? Have the same efforts also
reduced the systems’ efficacy by producing undesired outcomes? More directly,
has the effort to be fairer in terms of constitutional protections resulted in a less
fair process in the form of prolonged justice?
This article concludes the answers to all of these questions is “yes,” and
explores the next question of whether there are margins for schools to better
achieve legal efficiency within their honor systems. To do this, a review of the
implicated due process interests and procedures required to satisfy these interests
is in order.
IV. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS: OF PROPERTY OR LIBERTY?
The issues of what due process requirements apply to university and college
students and how those requirements are to be applied inspires passionate
debate. On the student side, protection of basic constitutional rights is of critical
importance, particularly when an educational degree, a potential career, and the
student’s personal and professional reputation may be at stake. 35 However, the
student is not the only party in this equation with a reputation to uphold.
Institutes of higher education certify, by way of their diplomas, that their
34. UNIV. OF VA., supra note 25, at 6, 23–24, 29, 42.
35. See Dutile, supra note 23, at 259.
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graduates will uphold the academic, honor, and other standards the school
expects of its graduates. Thus, in a pure contractual setting—that is, the graduate
must satisfy the institution in order to receive that certifying diploma—one
might ask, what property rights of the students even exist that would trigger due
process protection?
A. Property Interests: Without Just Compensation
The question of whether property rights exist in higher education has inspired
ample journalistic analyses, several of which are especially helpful in tackling
the honor system riddle. Professor Ferdinand Dutile’s Students and Due Process
in Higher Education: of Interests and Procedures provides perhaps the most
comprehensive analysis focusing on the various types of student dismissals,
academic, discipline, and honor, from the perspective of both public and private
institutions. 36 Professor Barbara A. Lee’s Judicial Review of Student Challenges
to Academic Misconduct Sanctions is a must-read because it reiterates points
made in Professor Dutile’s work, and focuses on how the courts deal with
academic, as opposed to disciplinary, penalties and dismissals, which is the
focus of most higher education honor systems. 37 Finally, in The Due Process
Clause and Students: The Road to a Single Approach of Determining Property
Interests in Education, Dalton Mott tackles the preliminary issue of whether
courts have found a property right in continued higher education. 38 He notes
that most courts have neglected to decide the issue affirmatively and implores
them to do so. 39
In short, courts have often found that property rights do exist in a student’s
education. 40 However, the question of whether and how this right applies to
higher education is far from settled. Though it deals with primary and secondary
education settings, Goss v. Lopez is considered the seminal case that identifies
both a property and liberty interest for students facing unfavorable action by
their schools. 41 The Goss court relies on Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth to assert that the determination of whether a due process right is triggered
depends upon the nature of the interest at stake, rather than the weight of the
interest. 42
To be sure, however, the property right identified by the Goss court was
predicated on a positive source for those rights, independent of the
36. See, e.g., Dutile, supra note 23.
37. Barbara A. Lee, Judicial Review of Student Challenges to Academic Misconduct
Sanctions, 39 J. COLL. & U.L. 511, 518 (2013).
38. Dalton Mott, The Due Process Clause and Students: The Road to a Single Approach of
Determining Property Interests in Education, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 651, 652–53 (2017).
39. Id. at 652.
40. See Dutile, supra note 23.
41. Goss, supra note 24.
42. Id. at 575–76 (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570–71
(1972)).
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Constitution. 43 In Goss, the right is born from a state’s mandate and providence
of a public school education. 44 The theory follows that if the state requires
education and your taxpayer dollars fund it, then withholding that education
from a student via a school suspension or expulsion would encroach on a
property right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. As such, the court
asserts that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are
not independent sources of property rights; rather, those rights must emanate
from an independent source of law. 45
However, courts are far from consistent in ruling that property rights exist in
education. 46 While Goss is the seminal case, its factual predicate involves a high
school, rather than a secondary or post-secondary educational institution. 47
While some courts, like Goss, maintain that only an independent source of law
can create a property right in education, many courts punt on that issue when it
involves a higher education setting, assume such right exists, and proceed
directly to discussing the required procedural components. 48 “Assume[d]” and
“generalized” property interests are theories that Mott takes issue with in The
Due Process Clause and Students: The Road to a Single Approach of
Determining Property Interests in Education. 49 The frustration with these
assumed property rights theories is that (1) they are not grounded in firm law or
precedent, and (2) leaving the issue unresolved results in disparate treatment
amongst judicial circuits. 50 Despite these critiques, many courts inevitably still
proceed with a procedural due process analysis on the grounds that the
underlying property right is assumed to exist. 51
From another angle, the question might be posed as to whether education at
any level is a fundamental right, at all. This was the issue in the landmark case,
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, where the court found
that education is not a fundamental right. 52 Lee v. University of MichiganDearborn cites the Rodriguez case in remarking that, “[w]hile a high school
student is entitled to procedural due process in pursuit of a free public education,
a student’s right to attend a public high school is not a ‘fundamental right’ for
purposes of substantive due process analysis.” 53 The Lee court further posits
43. Goss, supra note 24, at 572–73 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
44. Goss, supra note 24, at 573–74.
45. Id. at 572–73.
46. See Dutile, supra note 23, at 254–58.
47. Goss, 419 U.S. at 567.
48. Id. at 261, n.127.
49. Mott, supra note 38, at 652–53.
50. Id. at 656–67.
51. See Mott, supra note 38.
52. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
53. Lee v. Univ. of Mich.-Dearborn, No. 5:06-CV-66, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72236, at *13
(W.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2007) (first citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33–37; and then citing Seal v.
Morgan, 229 F.3d. 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2000)).
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that “[a] post-secondary student such as plaintiff has even a lesser claim that her
attendance at a college or university is a fundamental right. 54
Given this erratic case history, there remains an understandable tension
between stakeholders in this educational landscape that would coax us to view
this determination of rights as a balance of interests. That is, from the individual
student perspective, the question of whether a right exists in continued education
may not be an all or nothing proposition. Rather, whether a student has a
property interest in continued education, may depend on how much of his or her
interest has vested, based on the amount of coursework already completed, time
and money invested, etc. However, educational institutions would counterargue
by pointing out that such interests cannot be so easily vested if the state, in the
case of a public institution, has discretion over the “entitlement” of education. 55
The service academies, by virtue of commissioning each graduate as an officer
in their respective armed force, throw another variable into this determination of
educational rights. 56 That is, an enrolled cadet or midshipman may assert a right
to the commission in that they have a vested interest that is commensurate with
their investment in the service academy curriculum. Such argument would be
similar to the one above suggesting the amount of completion would determine
how much of that “right” has actually vested. However, this argument lacks
support in case precedent. 57 A simple review of the physical and health
requirements for mere entry into the military would suggest that, similar to other
skills-based professions, the military has a legitimate interest in ensuring its
inductees meet certain baseline medical criteria. 58 It follows that such entry
requirements would mirror other Fourteenth Amendment minimal scrutiny
analyses and need only rationally relate to the legitimate state interests. 59 Such
minimal scrutiny is a far cry from the proposition that service in the military is
a fundamental right deserving of a more stringent application of due process,
amongst other constitutional strictures.
Despite the cases and arguments that recommend caution against merely
assuming property interests exist in higher education, it is not difficult to
comprehend the attractiveness of adopting that assumption. First, the issue is
far from well-settled as illustrated above. Second, there is too much case history
that does find property interests in continued post-secondary education to
54. Id.
55. Mott, supra note 38, at 655.
56. See Justine P. Freedland, All the Process That is Due: An Article on Cadet Disenrollments
for the United States Military Academy and the Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, 2015
ARMY LAW. 5, at 8–9 (2015); John H. Beasley, The USMA Honor System – a Due Process Hybrid.,
118 MIL. L. REV. 187 (1989).
57. See Charlie Dunlap, Does the Constitution Really Require the Military to Induct Everyone
who Wants to Join? LAWFIRE (Aug. 4, 2017), https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2017/08/04/does-theconstitution-really-require-the-military-to-induct-everyone-who-wants-to-join/.
58. Id.
59. See Dutile, supra note 23, at 255.
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summarily overrule such a conclusion. 60 Third, with such absence of clarity, the
real “battleground” of this debate probably more appropriately resides in the
question of whether the amount of processes is adequate. Finally, some case
precedent supports the notion that the “other” of the two due process rights (the
liberty interest) is implicated in the post-secondary education scenario. 61
However, every one of these indeterminate arguments also beckon the
opposing analysis that due process property rights do not automatically exist in
higher education. Thus, further analysis of the appropriate amount of process
due should always consider whether the foundational property interest was not
universally found or was merely assumed to exist.
B. Liberty Interests: Securing the Blessings
Regardless of the unsettled property right issue, students who assert due
process challenges in light of a school sanction have a “second string to his
constitutional bow” as espoused by the Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George
Mason University decision. 62 That is, due process could also be implicated
based on liberty interests. 63 Unlike the courts that assumed a property right
exists in higher education, the Doe court set the course for interpreting whether
a liberty right exists much more broadly than just assuming they do. 64 The court
refrained from simply equating Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment breaches to
infringements on custodial or bodily restraint. 65 They further rejected the
previous articulation of a rigid rights-versus-privileges dichotomy when
determining when due process liberty is triggered. 66 The 2015 Doe case and
similar cases that represent an expanded scope of both property and liberty rights
are evidence that the “Due Process Revolution” that Mott referenced has had a
long lasting impact. 67
With the liberty table set, Doe and other courts theorize that school sanctions
such as suspension and expulsions carry with them future reputational costs that
can qualify as liberty interests. 68 The Donohue v. Baker case noted that “[i]t is
well settled that an expulsion from college is a stigmatizing event which
implicates a student’s protected liberty interest.” 69 One could then persuasively
argue that suspension or expulsion, especially when based on a failure of honor

60.
61.
62.
2015).
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., supra note 52.
See id.
Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 132 F. Supp. 3d 712, 721 (E.D. Va.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 572).
Doe, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 721.
See Mott, supra note 38, at 654, 675.
See Doe, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 721–22 (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 575).
Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 145 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
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rather than an academic shortcoming, could saddle the student with an extremely
significant and negative stigma for future endeavors.
However, this is not to say that a school’s adverse action towards a student
always triggers a liberty interest. Some courts have failed to recognize a liberty
interest in continued education or in other facets of the educational experience,
such as the mere threat of suspension, or rejection of a proposed thesis topic. 70
A Ninth Circuit court held there was no liberty interest in a medical student’s
dismissal based on substandard performance, though it did find a property
interest. 71 Despite the courts’ erratic posture on the liberty interest, it would
appear the stronger consensus is that an honor violation expulsion would more
naturally reside among the cases where the court found an educational liberty
interest. A prospective school or employer may harbor more sympathy for a
student who was dismissed from another school because he or she just could not
measure up academically than for the student expelled because they attempted
to cheat.
As discussed later, a reputational interest is but one side of the equation
balancing the interests of the individual and the institution. 72 Further, as
discussed above, there are many arguments abound for and against a finding of
a property or liberty interest in education, continued enrollment, graduation, or
military commission upon graduating from a service academy or senior military
college. Authors such as Mott have sounded the chorus for courts to clarify this
issue. 73 In the meantime, if we were to assume such liberty rights are triggered,
we could then move to the next part of the due process analysis bearing in mind
that the foundational rights upon which that analysis is based are indeed tenuous.
Assuming there is either a property or liberty interest invoked by a school’s
adverse action against a student, the next logical question to tackle is what type
of process is required?
C. Procedural Due Process Requirements
With due process in play, what procedures are required to satisfy due process
for schoolhouse actions that negatively impact students? To help answer that
question, the landmark Goss v. Lopez case invoked the tried and true basic due
process components of notice and a hearing and quoted the Grannis v. Ogden
case in attempting to clarify those terms. 74 Since Goss, the courts have provided
little clarity about the details of what constitutes notice and a hearing, suggesting

70. See Dutile, supra note 23, at 258 (citing Ndefru v. Sherwood, No. 93-4127-SAC, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18621 (D. Kan. Dec. 29, 1993)).
71. See Dutile, supra note 23, at 255, 260 (citing Stretton v. Wadsworth Veterans Hosp., 537
F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1976)).
72. See infra Part B.
73. See Mott, supra note 38, at 652–53.
74. Goss, 419 U.S. at 578 (citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).

Fall 2021]

Forming a More Perfect Honor System

613

that “some kind of notice” and “some kind of hearing” will satisfy Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process requirements. 75
This is not to say that courts have issued absolutely no guidance as to what
constitutes appropriate notice and hearing. Various courts have helped define
the contours of those due process requirements to some extent, however the
situation still remains murky. 76 One line of jurisprudence contends the amount
of process due increases or decreases depending on the level of individual
interest at stake. 77 Another line of reasoning is that those institutions, schools
and the military, remain on the right side of the constitutional line so long as
they follow their own processes and procedures. 78 This guidance still falls short
of precisely defining requirements to satisfy the “some type of notice” and
“some type of hearing” are requirements. 79
Alas, along comes the Mathews v. Eldridge case which provides a test for
helping determine whether the amount of process given is adequate in due
process scenarios. 80 A social security benefits case, Mathews introduces a threefactor test to help determine if the processes afforded area adequate:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
[(2)], the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and [(3)], the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements
would entail. 81
While the Mathews court provided a much-needed template for defining the
contours of due process requirements in a generic sense, follow-on court cases
have bifurcated due-process for educational institution sanctions into two
categories: academic and disciplinary. 82 In short, courts accord more deference
to school educators and administrators on questions of academic failure, going
75. Dutile, supra note 23, at 245.
76. Id.
77. Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 210–11 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing how
administrative discipline measures such as demerits at a service academy that “invokes at most the
relatively minor immediate consequence of disciplinary punishments or withdrawal of weekend or
other privileges” would not require as much process as an infraction that would threaten expulsion.
The court further opined, “the procedures available to a cadet (explanation of a reported
delinquency, request for reconsideration, and appeal to superior authorities) are ample to satisfy the
demands of due process, even with respect to demerits awarded by the Tactical Officer for
delinquencies reported by the Tactical Officer himself. This is so because the sanctions imposed
are slight, the nature of the proceeding is corrective and educational, and the burden on the
proceedings which [the additional process right of] a hearing would impose is excessive.”).
78. Friedberg v. Resor, 453 F.2d 935, 938 (2d Cir. 1971); Dutile, supra note 23, at 279.
79. See Dutile, supra note 23, at 245.
80. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
81. Id. at 335.
82. See Dutile, supra note 23, at 265.

614

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70:599

as far as to dispense altogether with the hearing requirement. 83 From a
procedural due process angle, Board of Curators of University of Missouri v.
Horowitz explains that academic decisions must be “careful and deliberate.” 84
From the substantive due process angle, the Regents of University of Michigan
v. Ewing court advised that the judiciary was loathe to overturn the decisions of
school administrators unless the decision reveals “such a substantial departure
from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee
responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.” 85 In short, courts
have afforded the greatest degree of deference to school administrators when
dealing with academic failure. As a policy matter, courts bestow this latitude to
avoid cultivating an atmosphere in which every academic failure determination
ends up in the courts of law. 86
For disciplinary sanctions, courts have generally required a bit more in terms
of process requirements than for academic failure sanctions. 87 Perhaps the most
patently obvious difference is that courts generally have not fully dispensed with
the requirement of a hearing. In Ingraham v. Wright, the court applied the three
Mathews factors as they pertain to disciplinary hearings as follows: “[(]1) The
nature of the interest protected, [(]2) the danger of error and the benefit of
additional or other procedures, and [(]3) the burden on the government such
procedures would present.” 88
Follow-on cases continued to apply and shape the Mathews criteria to
formulate several themes. First, that the level of severity of the sanction is an
important factor in the calculus for determining how much process is due. 89
Second, while courts generally agree that disciplinary cases require some kind
of notice and some kind of hearing, having legal representation present at the
hearing is not a protected right. 90 Finally, while the courts have generally
required more procedural rights for disciplinary cases, there still is a significant
amount of deference yielded to the educational institutions in deciding how to
best administratively achieve their goals to avoid the undesired effect of having
their disciplinary processes devolve into criminal trials. 91
83. Id. at 282 (citing Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978)).
84. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 85.
85. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985).
86. See, e.g., Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 88–90.
87. See Dutile, supra note 23, at 267.
88. Id. at 265 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)).
89. Id. at 266.
90. Id. at 272, n.211 (citing multiple cases spanning several circuits that failed to recognize
the right to have counsel present at school disciplinary proceedings).
91. See Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1250 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (“[A]
school disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial, nor is a student accused of cheating entitled
to all the procedural safeguards afforded criminal defendants.” citing Jenkins v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992, 1000 (5th Cir. 1975)); Betts v. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.2d 629, 633 (7th
Cir. 1972); Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 415 F.2d 1077, 1089–90 (8th Cir. 1969); Jackson v.
Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1970) (“To hold that the relationship between parents, pupils
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D. Is Honor Academic or Disciplinary?
Regardless of whether the sanction at issue falls into the academic or
disciplinary category, the required process for either category has not been
coherently articulated. That presents the key conundrum for determining
appropriate process in honor systems. Irrespective of an honor infraction’s
categorization, the natural institutional reaction is to be overly cautious. To be
safe rather than sorry is the watchword, especially when a school’s
administrative action dances close to the margins of infringing upon students’
constitutional protections. Maintaining a fail-safe posture, a school might
theorize, would also help stave off legal challenges of their honor systems,
especially challenges that turn out to be successful.
In the eyes of the courts, where do educational institutions’ honor systems fall
in this dichotomy between academic and disciplinary dismissals? That answer,
much like the determination of what rights are at play, is not 100% clear. Due
to the components of most honor codes, there is a natural bifurcation depending
on the nature of the offense. For a typical code which prohibits lying, cheating,
or stealing, two of those three elements are a bit easier to categorize. Stealing,
a conduct offense that also incorporates an honor element, routinely would be
viewed as a misconduct, rather than as academic, since the offense is also likely
to be enumerated in the school’s discipline code and could even constitute a
criminal offense. 92 Lying would likely find itself in the misconduct camp as
well. Even though lying would not necessarily invoke a criminal violation, the
proscription would normally be nested within the school’s conduct code. An
even deeper analysis would suggest lying and stealing are appropriately
categorized as misconduct offenses since these actions are forbidden because of
their “behavioral component.” 93 Further, labeling these offenses as misconduct
would parallel with the institution’s desire to eradicate such behavior. In short,
student dispositions based on allegations of lying and stealing seem to naturally
reside in the misconduct camp.
That leaves us with cheating. Most of the time, but certainly not always,
allegations of cheating emanate from the academic classroom. As discussed,
academic failure dismissals generally elicit the most judicial deference as courts
loathe interfering with the professional judgment of educators in determinations
of academic merit. 94 Would it not follow, then, that a school’s sanction based
and school officials must be conducted in an adversary atmosphere and accordingly the procedural
rules to which we are accustomed in a court of law would hardly best serve the interests of any of
those involved.”).
92. See, e.g., Church Educational System Honor Code, BYU, https://policy.byu.edu/
view/index.php?p=26 (last visited Apr. 10, 2021) (enumerating standards of the BYU Honor Code,
and noting that many of these offenses of the honor code overlap with conduct standards and may
indeed be found in conduct codes of other schools, rather in their honor codes).
93. See Lee, supra note 37, at 518.
94. See, e.g., Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225 (articulating the substantive due process review standard
for questions regarding academic failure, and explaining that “[w]hen judges are asked to review

616

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70:599

on alleged classroom cheating should also command such deference? Here
again, the courts have been rather inconsistent with their findings. Cheating on
an exam, for example, possesses a “behavioral component” that most courts
would likely categorize as misconduct. 95 Considering this, recall that the
latitude granted to school faculty in academic matters is based on a professional
judgment assumption. That is, for academic merit questions, the courts
generally conclude that instructors and professors, academic professionals, are
better equipped to evaluate those matters requiring their professional expertise
than a court. 96 However, a faculty member’s professional academic expertise is
not always necessary to discern whether the act of cheating occurred. It follows
that some courts might not yield the same broad degree of deference to academic
institutions for academic misconduct, cheating, as they typically do for academic
performance.
Given that logic, one might also be tempted to conclude that courts would
defer to the educators on whether or not an academic plagiarism offense was
committed, given the educators familiarity with published works. However, the
courts have been rather inconsistent on that issue, as well. On one hand, one
court went so far as standing firm to its deferential default when professors
resolve student plagiarism questions, even if the allegations turn out to be
unfounded. 97 The court justified this stance by explaining the appropriate scope
of review was limited to assessing whether the professor had “a legitimate basis
to conclude that Plaintiff had plagiarized and should be expelled” and whether
the professor “used their professional judgment in making those decisions.” 98
Still other courts categorize plagiarism as academic misconduct, given that
behavioral component, and apply the same standard of review to student
misconduct cases. 99
Regardless of whether academic honor violations are categorized as
misconduct, or academic offenses, or a type of hybrid offense where an
institution casts the offense as a type of ‘academic misconduct,’ courts have
required educational institutions to afford some type of process. 100 Depending
on the flavor of offense, however, the distinction between the three would be the
degree of deference the court affords the educational institution. Further, while
some judicial decisions subscribe to Justice Powell’s concurrence in Ewing that
the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect
for the faculty’s professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a
substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee
responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment”).
95. See Lee, supra note 37, at 518.
96. Id. at 516–18.
97. See Mawle v. Tex. A&M Univ.–Kingsville, No. CC-08-64, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42496,
at *24–25, 28 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2010).
98. Id. at 28.
99. See Lee, supra note 37, at 518.
100. See Dutile, supra note 23.
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academic misconduct cases do not involve the fundamental rights necessary to
trigger substantive due process, the questions of the need for and degree of
procedural due process protections remains. 101
V. HONOR SYSTEMS IN COURT: ESTABLISHING JUSTICE
Considering the due process discussion above, a brief survey of some relevant
court challenges to college and university honor systems is in order. This review
demonstrates a trend that honor systems from some of the well-established
schools have generally fared well against legal challenges. That is, courts
generally have found the processes afforded those accused of honor violations
at these schools comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
A. The Virginia Schools: Give Me Liberty
1. Henson v. Honor Committee of the University of Virginia.
A 1983 challenge of the University of Virginia’s Honor Committee was
brought by a former law student whose expulsion from the University was
ultimately due to a non-honor infraction. 102 Josiah Henson faced both academic
deficiency struggles as well as an honor violation allegation. 103 After an
extended honor system process which included retrials and appeals, the students
originally alleging the violation ended up dropping their charges. 104 However,
Henson was still dismissed from the university for his academic
shortcomings. 105
The Henson case still involved a constitutional challenge to the University’s
Honor System. The rationale to Henson’s honor complaint was that his having
to expend time and resources fighting the honor allegations ultimately interfered
with his ability to ensure his academic grades were in order. 106 His
constitutional argument was that the University of Virginia Honor System fell

101. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 229-30 (Powell, J., Concurring) (casting doubt as to whether
substantive due process even exists in the higher education due process equation, stating, “[w]hile
property interests are protected by procedural due process even though the interest is derived from
state law rather than the Constitution, substantive due process rights are created only by the
Constitution,” and further remarking that a purported interest higher education “bears little
resemblance to the fundamental interests that previously have been viewed as implicitly protected
by the Constitution”). The substantive due process component of higher education sanctions has
not received as much attention in this article because, to a large extent, there is a bit of overlap in
the standards of the two. The components of the substantive due process jurisprudence that bear
the most relevance to these issues are reviewed in this article.
102. Henson v. Honor Comm. of Univ. Va., 719 F.2d 69, 70 (4th Cir. 1983).
103. Id. at 70.
104. Id. at 71.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 72–73.
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short of due process protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 107
Thus, Henson’s theory was essentially that this constitutionally inept honor
system impeded his academic standing.
The court rejected Henson’s logic that his demise was the fault of either the
academic or the honor systems. 108 Rather, since his own actions prompted the
honor processes, the conundrum was one of his own making. 109 In doing so, the
court listed a number of processes afforded students navigating the University’s
honor system and deemed them ample under the Fourteenth Amendment. 110 It
cited Horowitz in reminding that a template of stringent, inflexible procedures,
or those afforded to a criminal defendant, are not required in the educational
institution setting. 111 The court quoted Mathews’ statement that “the judicial
model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective,
method of decision-making in all circumstances.” 112 Further, “[t]he essence of
due process is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss be given
notice of the case against him and the opportunity to meet it.’” 113 The court also
referred to the landmark Goss case which “recognized that the requirements of
due process may be satisfied by something less than a trial-like proceeding.” 114
To be sure, the Henson court did not issue a blanket endorsement of the
University of Virginia Honor System’s procedures, suggesting they do not
“represent a model for assuring constitutional due process in all administrative
settings.” 115 However, the court noted that in the wake of a “substantial”
personal stake, Henson and others similarly situated have in the potential
outcome of the honor process—for example loss of law degree, inability to enter
the legal profession—the University of Virginia Honor System’s procedures
were “constitutionally sufficient to safeguard his interest from an erroneous or
arbitrary decision.” 116

107. Id. at 73.
108. Henson, 719 F.2d at 72.
109. Id. at 73 (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254–55 (1978) (explaining that the
University or the University Honor Code did not cause Henson’s misfortunes, either academic or
honor related, and the damages he incurred in the form of distractions and time spent dealing with
the honor allegations could not be constitutionally compensable “unless it was caused by the
University’s actions”)).
110. Henson, 719 F.2d at 74–75.
111. Id. at 74.
112. Id. at 73–74.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 74.
115. Id. at 74–75.
116. Henson, 719 F.2d at 74–75.
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2. Butler v. Rector and Board of Visitors of the College of William and
Mary
Emanating from the University of Virginia’s sister school in Williamsburg,
Virginia the Butler case at the College of William and Mary is similar to the
Henson case at the University of Virginia in that the student’s ultimate challenge
was not based on an honor violation expulsion. 117 In fact, the court made clear
to dissociate the student-run Honor Council’s not-guilty finding from the
faculty-directed disciplinary processes that ultimately led to Butler’s
dismissal. 118 The case is still instructive as it illustrates how courts might deal
with disciplinary dismissals that involve collateral honor violation allegations.
The court also highlights an often-marginalized component in education related
due process analyses: the interests of the school. 119
The Honor Council also reviewed the misconduct which ultimately led to
Butler’s dismissal from William and Mary, since the conduct in question
included five allegations of lying. 120 During Butler’s appeal, the William and
Mary faculty designee to review honor appeals found a jurisdictional defect in
four of the honor counts and concluded that the remaining count was not
grounded on evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 121 Butler cited
the Honor Council’s eventual acquittal for support when challenging her
disciplinary expulsion. 122
While the Butler court logically does not center its analysis around the
dismissed honor allegation, the court’s analysis provides three insightful points
to help describe its honor system jurisprudence. First, the court categorized the
core issue as disciplinary, subjecting it to the more stringent misconduct
dismissal due process standards. 123 It then applied the Mathews test in
dismissing the procedural due process challenge and set aside Butler’s
substantive due process argument under the more accommodating “arbitrary”
and “egregious” analysis. 124 Thus, in evaluating a challenge to a dismissal based
on professional misconduct—misconduct similar to what honor systems seek to

117. Butler v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of the Coll. of William & Mary, 121 F. App’x. 515,
518 (4th Cir. 2005).
118. Id. at 519.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 518.
121. Id. (Gregory, J., concurring).
122. Butler, 121 F. App’x. at 519.
123. Id. at 520 n.2 (citations omitted) (“We assume for purposes of this appeal, but need not
decide, that Butler’s expulsion was for disciplinary and not academic reasons. Disciplinary
dismissals require greater procedural safeguards than academic dismissals. It is unnecessary to
reach this issue because we conclude that William and Mary’s conduct satisfies even the more
exacting standard.”).
124. Id. at 519.
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prevent—the court ruled in favor of the educational institution while applying
the same Mathews test that can also be used for pure honor matters. 125
Second, the court’s concurring opinion applauded William and Mary for
following its Honor Code procedures in addition to the requirements in its
Counseling Program handbook, both of which Butler was accused of
violating. 126 This opinion aligns with a consistent theme that courts are less
likely to reject a school’s procedural due processes for disciplinary or honor
sanctions, so long as the school follows its own process. 127
Third, in evaluating the first prong of the Mathews decision, the Butler court
notably made a point that often gets less attention when analyzing cases of
student dismissals. 128 For while it is true that courts appropriately focus their
analyses of constitutional individual liberty deprivations on the individual, the
court made clear to appreciate the counterbalancing interests of the school, in
this case, the College of William and Mary. Essentially, the court reasoned that
because “William and Mary’s interest in controlling the integrity of its graduate
programs is also high,” that interest counterbalanced the individual’s interest
articulated in the first Mathews prong. 129 Because the first and third prongs of
the Mathews test essentially canceled each other out, the court hinged its
decision on the second Mathews factor—”the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional substitute procedural safeguards.” 130 As seen in many of these cases
critiquing schools’ honor and discipline processes, the balance of that Mathews
prong fell in favor of the College of William and Mary. 131
3. The Virginia Military Institute cases: A Well Regulated Militia
A “hybrid” between our public university schools and military schools, the
Virginia Military Institute is one of the few remaining educational institutions
that unabashedly maintains a pure “single sanction” honor system. 132 The
system’s simplicity is evident on the school’s website where it explains,
The VMI Honor System is a single sanction system. The system does
not recognize degrees of honor. The sanction for any breach of honor
is dismissal. So, when new cadets sign the book on matriculation day
they are committing themselves to a life of honesty and integrity. If

125. See Mathews, infra note 154.
126. See id. at 521–22 (Gregory, J., concurring).
127. See Dutile, supra note 23, at 279.
128. See Mathews, infra note 154, at 520.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 519.
132. Honor System, VA. MIL. INST., https://www.vmi.edu/cadet-life/cadet-leadership-anddevelopment/honor-system/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2021).
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their commitment is not complete, their stay at the Institute may be
short. 133
With such an austere prologue, one might imagine that the Virginia Military
Institute’s honor system would be especially susceptible to due process
challenges. While not as lengthy as the University of Virginia’s honors system
by-laws or the College of William and Mary’s honor constitution, Virginia
Military Institute’s system nonetheless includes at least some process for
ensuring “adequate” notice and an opportunity for the student to be heard. 134
How has the Virginia Military Institute system fared? The Pack v. Virginia
Military Institute and Smith v. Military Institute cases bookend two decades of
unsuccessful court challenges to the Institute’s honor system. 135
In Pack v. Virginia Military Institute, a cadet challenged both the procedural
and substantive due process aspects of his conviction by the Honor Court that
led to his expulsion from the Institute. 136 Rejecting his procedural due process
challenge, the court held,
[E]ven a cursory inspection of the Appendix indicates that the
appellant assuredly was advised of the charges against him, of the
factual evidence underlying those charges, of his right to trial, and was
afforded a full trial with the right to present evidence the right to cross
examine prosecution fitnesses, [sic] and the right to counsel. There can
be no doubt that procedural due process was amply provided in this
case. 137
Regarding Pack’s substantive due process claim, the court made two key
pronouncements. First, as a preliminary matter, the court considered the
complainant’s claim of a substantive due process violation based on deprivation
of a fundamental right—in this case, impeding his completion of the Virginia
Military Institute program. 138 In declining to sustain that assertion, the court
cited case law where the Supreme Court has “consistently held that education is
not one of the ‘core’ or ‘fundamental rights.’” 139 Second, it agreed with the
lower court’s evidentiary analysis that concluded there were no substantive
“contractual, legal, and constitutional infirmities of the Honor System,” as Pack
had alleged. 140
133. Id.
134. See VMI Summer Session Honor System Standard Operations Procedure, VA. MIL. INST.,
http://catalog.vmi.edu/content.php?catoid=2&navoid=9 (last visited Apr. 10, 2020).
135. Pack v. Va. Mil. Inst., No. 89-2012, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 21409 (4th Cir. July 24, 1989)
(per curiam); Smith v. Va. Military Inst., No. 6:09-cv-00053, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52900 (W.D.
Va. May 27, 2010).
136. Pack v. Va. Mil. Inst., No. 89-2012, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 21409, at *1–2 (4th Cir. July
24, 1989) (per curiam).
137. Id. at *3 (per curiam) (emphasis added).
138. See id. at *5–6 (per curiam).
139. Id. at *4 (per curiam).
140. Id. at *5 (per curiam).
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Twenty-one years later, Virginia Military Institute’s Honor System again
faced a challenge in Smith v. Virginia Military Institute. 141 In that case, the
appellant alleged the Honor Court’s process to be procedurally deficient in the
context of both property and liberty interests. 142 While the court expressed doubt
about Smith’s claim that he had a property interest in continued enrollment at
the institute—based on the theory that the state must create that entitlement for
that right to exist—it took the position similar to many courts in simply assuming
such an interest existed. 143 In dismissing the claim that Virginia Military
Institute’s honor processes were inadequate, the court cited the thorough factual
and procedural record of Smith’s honor proceedings, asserting Smith was “given
adequate notice” and “provided an opportunity to be heard” which included
“pre-trial processings; a trial in a student run VMI Honor Court, monitored by
one of the defendants, Captain Reiser (the Superintendent’s Representative); a
review of the Honor Court’s decision by General Peay, Superintendent of VMI;
and the Board of Visitor’s denial of plaintiff’s appeal.” 144 In short, the court
applied a minimalist view of what procedures in an educational honor setting
satisfy the due process clause. Because Smith received adequate notice and was
provided an opportunity to be heard, the court found Virginia Military Institute’s
Honor System as applied to Smith to be constitutionally sound. 145
4. West Point Cases: Providing for the Common Defense
A review of the storied and fluid history of the Honor System at West Point
would not be complete without discussing the court-influenced underpinnings
of the current system. On the crest of the “due process revolution” wave, a
disciplinary case out of the United States Merchant Marine Academy provided
some legal contour for service academy dismissal processes. 146 Wasson v.
Trowbridge championed a flexible approach to procedural due process as a
balancing test of the private vs. government interests involved. 147 For service
academies, the court reasoned, the government interest exceeds that of its
civilian university counterparts. 148 The court maintained that such misconduct
dismissals trigger the due process-required notice and hearing, and even went as

141. See Smith v. Va. Military Inst., No. 6:09-cv-00053, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52900 (W.D.
Va. May 27, 2010).
142. Id. at *12.
143. Id. at *13.
144. Id. at *14–15.
145. See id.
146. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
147. See id. at 812.
148. Id. (contrasting the Wasson facts from the landmark Dixon v. Alabama State Board of
Education case in that when dealing with a service academy, “the private interest must yield to a
greater degree” to the “vital and sensitive areas of government concern such as national security
and military affairs” whereas Dixon did not involve any “such paramount government interest.”
citing Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961)).
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far as requiring the availability of defense counsel for the cadet. 149 However,
the court asserted that in the non-adversarial spirit of such boards and dismissals,
due process does not require a lawyer to be physically present at the disciplinary
hearing. 150
The United States Military Academy case of Hagopian v. Knowlton similarly
involved a due process challenge disciplinary dismissal from a service
academy. 151 The Hagopian court relied on Wasson as precedent to promote a
flexible and non-adversarial approach to the due process question. 152 To further
elaborate, the court asserted that the process due is relative to the potential
adjudged sanction, such that, a potential expulsion from the school would
warrant more substantial processes to protect the interests of the individual. 153
As such, and perhaps a harbinger for future jurisprudential development on the
issue, the Hagopian court’s philosophy finds some congruency with the test
eventually articulated in the Mathews case. 154 However, the court did not
mandate any particular level of formality for the procedures, nor did it require
the hearing component to occur at a particular time in the process. 155 The
primary revelation from the Hagopian decision is: for disciplinary expulsions—
as opposed to academic removals—the school must afford the student the ability
to appear and present witnesses on his behalf. 156 The court also reiterated the
mantra that by following their own rules and procedures, these institutions would
minimize premature due process missteps. 157
Andrews v. Knowlton, a consolidated appeal with a similar case, White v.
Knowlton, involved challenges to West Point expulsions due to honor code
violations. 158 The cases also represented a turning point for the Academy’s
honor system in terms of procedural due process, contemporaneous with the
“due process revolution. 159“ The court ultimately ruled in favor of the appellee,
149. Id. at 810.
150. Id. at 812.
151. Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972).
152. Id. at 207–09.
153. See id. at 208.
154. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
155. See id. at 212 (“The foregoing is intended merely to convey, for the guidance of the
Academy, the rudiments of due process required for disciplinary proceedings. It will be for the
Academy within this rough framework to determine the precise procedures to be employed.”).
156. Id. at 211.
157. See id. at 208 (quoting Friedberg v. Resor, 453 F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1971) (“With
respect to decisions made by Army authorities, ‘orderly government requires us to tread lightly on
the military domain, with scrupulous regard for the power and authority of the military
establishment to govern its own affairs within the broad confines of constitutional due process.’”)).
But see id. n.23 (citing Friedberg, 453 F.2d at 938) (“[W]here military ‘regulations prescribed
specific steps to be taken to insure due process they must be substantially observed.’”)). In addition,
“[n]o claim is made in this case that the Academy failed to follow its own procedures.” Id.
158. Andrews v. Knowlton, 509 F.2d 898, 900 (2d Cir. 1975).
159. See Mott, supra note 38.
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Knowlton, by holding that the overall honor processes, which included the right
to appeal to a board of officers independent of and above the cadet honor
committee and Academy, were adequate. 160 The court’s conclusion, however,
did not issue a blanket endorsement of the cadet-run honor committee’s
processes. Indeed, the court remarked that the cadet procedures were “wholly
lacking in procedural safeguards.” 161 However, consistent with the judiciary’s
aversion to micromanaging military affairs, the Andrews court concluded that
“the Due Process Clause does not require the utilization of any particular
procedure by the Cadet Honor Committee.” 162
Part in response to the due process infirmities pointed out in the Andrews v.
Knowlton decision, somewhat because of the cheating scandal of the mid-1970s,
and to some extent as a reaction to cadet cynicism as to whether the honorrelated decisions are actually made by cadets in the cadet honor committee, the
Academy shifted course in the mid-1970s. 163 Essentially, it abandoned the
former dual-tier system, Cadet Honor Committee adjudication with the option
to appeal to a Board of Officers, in favor of a single-tier system incorporating
due process protection. 164 This change set the foundation for the due-process
honor system West Point adheres to today.
As court challenges to West Point honor expulsions have persisted since this
due process shift, the 1996 Phillips v. United States 165 case is worth a review.
In considering the cadet’s plea for injunctive relief against the Academy’s honor
sanctions, the Phillips court reviewed West Point’s honor system procedures in
order to render a judgment as to whether the student-plaintiff was likely to
succeed on the merits of his claim. 166 In ruling against the student, the court
found, amongst other things, that Phillips was provided “ample notice” and a
“full and fair hearing.” 167 Above, all the court noted that the Academy
“scrupulously” 168 followed its own regulations. In short, the court gave a post
“due process shift” era endorsement to both the honor system procedures and
the Academy’s proclivity to follow them.
In short, the honor systems of the University of Virginia, the College of
William and Mary, the Virginia Military Institute, and the United States Military
160. Id. at 907–08.
161. Id. at 907.
162. Id.
163. See SORLEY, supra note 1, at 114–15 (“[T]he cadets completely eliminated the two-tier
system in favor of a single ‘due process’ hearing at the Cadet Full Honor Board level.”). The
enumeration of events that precipitated this change is certainly not exhaustive. Other critical events
that compelled the changes were the Academy’s Electrical Engineering cheating scandal and
convening of the Borman Commission to evaluate both the Academy’s response to the cheating
scandal and the overall efficacy of the honor system.
164. See id. at 115.
165. Phillips v. United States, 910 F. Supp. 101 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
166. Id. at 107–08.
167. Id. at 108–09.
168. Phillips v. United States, 910 F.Supp. 101, 109 (E.D. N.Y. 1996).
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Academy at West Point have all withstood legal challenges in recent years.
While this is just a sampling, a more thorough review of cases involving
challenges to schools’ honor systems finds few others that ended up in the court
system and even fewer of those that resulted in successful challenges.
Perhaps the most instructive outcomes of these cases are threefold. First, aside
from the Andrews case, courts routinely endorse the procedural due process
attributes of college and university honor systems. 169 While Andrews was an
outlier in this regard, the court still endorsed the overall process and prompted
West Point to apply the requisite due process protections in place at the Board
of Officers level to the cadet honor committee level. 170
Second, the courts found that these schools routinely followed their own
enumerated procedures for dealing with honor or collateral dismissals. 171 While
following their own rules is a fail-safe method for schools to stay on the right
side of the procedural due process line, some courts admitted that failure to do
so does not always equate to a fatal constitutional flaw. 172
Finally, some of these cases, especially Butler, amplified the recognition of
the interests of the schools. This provides educational institutions with a
counterbalance to a challenge that is inordinately focused on the individual’s
interests and rights. This is especially noteworthy in light of the increasing
amount of due process rights courts are finding in the educational sanction
context as well as the upward trend of focus on the individual’s rights in these
matters. All three of these observations feed into this article’s theme that the
path to a more perfect honor system must not be adorned with more legal
protections.
V. ANALYSIS: FOUR REASONS SCHOOLS HAVE LATITUDE TO CURB HONOR
SYSTEM LEGALIZATION
A. The Imperative for Change
Before delving into this article’s primary message that educational institutions
have latitude to streamline their honor systems’ legal components, it is an
opportune time to review reasons why these honor systems, in general, need to
be simplified. First, while the educational institutions may promote and pride
their honor systems as being non-adversarial, and, by extension, non-litigious,
the opposite is happening on college campuses. Indeed, by creating more of a
legal structure in which the students involved with honor code violations can
operate, students will assume there is a legal solution to their problem. This is
169. See Butler, supra note 117.
170. See SORLEY, supra note 1, at 114–15.
171. See Butler, supra note 117.
172. See, e.g., Dutile, supra note 23, at 278–79; Jones v. Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C.,
704 F.2d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussing how a state’s failure to follow its own procedures
would not necessarily amount to a due process violation, except for when such a departure invoked
an unfair and prejudicial detrimental reliance that those procedures would be followed).
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not to mention the natural tendency for a student to avoid ownership of their
alleged transgressions when a legal solution could potentially exonerate them,
clear their good name, and sidestep the liberty harms some courts have found to
be at stake. In short, a legal system begets a litigious process. In the long run,
an overly litigious honor system does not benefit either the individual or the
institution.
This lean towards litigiousness feeds into a second imperative for schools to
revise their honor systems: time. While the austere honor processes of
yesteryear may, in some cases, have deprived students of constitutional due
process rights, the processes at many schools today have become extremely
lengthy. As an example, in the not too distant past, the Secretary of the Army
required the United States Military Academy to complete its honor cases within
60 days. 173 A recently publicized occurrence of honor violations at the Academy
reveal that the length allegation to resolution timeline for those cases was almost
a year. 174 The case history reviewed above reveals that other schools have
similarly time-consuming honor processes, and that is so even before the cases
enter the court system.
This is not to assume the leadership at West Point or other institutions do not
agree that their honor processing times should be shortened; indeed, they
continually work towards striking the right balance between individual rights
and the mission of their institution. 175 A review of West Point’s modern honor
processes leads to the logical conclusion that embedded legal processes are a
significant contributor to the system’s unwieldiness. An overly lengthy honor
process inordinately taxes any educational institution’s resources while dragging
out a process that leaves both the institution and the student in the lurch, in terms
of status and final resolution. The University of Virginia’s Honor Audit
Commission released a 2017–2018 report which found a faculty “perception that
cases take too long and the process is overly burdensome.” 176 While most of the
court challenges to the mentioned institutions’ honor systems have related to
inadequate procedural due process, it seems that it is only a matter of time before
173. See, e.g., Phillips, 910 F. Supp. at 106 (“The sixty (60) days for the processing of Cadet
Honor cases commence, under the rule, with the report of a violation to a CHR and conclude (if a
violation is found) when the case is received by Headquarters. . . . Certain days are excluded in
computing the sixty (60) days within which Headquarters is required to receive the case.” (citing a
previous edition of USCC Pamphlet 15-1, 2-19, 2-20)). This 60-day rule was implemented
pursuant to the Secretary of the Army.
174. See West Point Concludes Honor Code Investigations, Discontinues Willful Admission
Process, UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY WEST POINT (Apr. 16, 2021),
https://www.westpoint.edu/news/press-releases/west-point-concludes-honor-code-investigationsdiscontinues-willful-admission .
175. See, e.g., SORLEY, supra note 1. Mr. Sorley’s entire book is dedicated to a history of
change aimed at perfecting the West Point Honor System and so invokes the notion that its current
conception is overly time consuming. To assume the Academy leadership is not aware of the
lengthy process and aims to shorten it would be a shortsighted conclusion.
176. Honor Audit Commission: 2017–2018 Report, supra note 20, at 11.
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the central issue—as opposed to a collateral matter—of future challenges is the
inability of the process to provide requisite swift justice. 177
Finally, as honor systems sustain and even increase their level of intricacy,
the degree of understanding by all stakeholders will naturally decrease. Staff
and faculty of educational institutions will flounder to understand their roles in
honor processes. More distressingly, the faculty and students alike will also fail
to garner a mutual understanding about how the byzantine system works. The
same University of Virginia Honor Audit found “78% of students do not know
who their [honor] representative is and 68% do not know who to contact about
a possible Honor violation” and that “survey results indicate a general lack of
knowledge about the Honor System among the faculty.” 178 The Commission
also found that “22% of faculty members indicated that the biggest deterrent to
reporting an Honor offense is that reporting and following through with a case
takes too much time.” 179 Thus, with such convoluted processes, it is only when
a student gets accused of an honor violation that they will become interested in
how the process works. And if it takes a lawyer to figure out the system, guess
who the students will hire to help them navigate it?
The foregoing illustrates the imperative for schools to streamline their honor
systems. Because the propagation of legal processes is a primary cause of the
systems’ current complexity, this article not only endeavors to explain why the
institutions have the leeway to do so, but urges the time is nigh for such
introspection and change.
B. The Latitude for Change.
1. Interests on Shaky Ground?
While the courts experienced a “due process revolution” and society has
become increasingly litigious, it is difficult to imagine the courts reversing their
trend of finding property or liberty interests for students under investigation for
honor infractions. Whether it be a reputation interest, a vested interest in
continuing higher education towards a degree, or the prestige or profession upon
which that degree bestows, the courts will probably still find an interest or
presume one when presented a due process challenge of an honor system.
However, that is not to say the prospect that honor system dismissals are on
firm due process grounds in the eyes of the courts. To the contrary, there have
been cases in which no such interest has been found, an outcome which would
obviously benefit the educational institution that finds itself in the middle of a
177. See, e.g., Steven Reed Armstrong, The Argument for Agency Self-Enforcement of
Discovery Orders, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 218 n.16 (“The sixth amendment and rule 1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are only two of the significant legal documents that recognize the
necessity of swift justice if justice is to be had. This basic precept of law is no less essential in the
realm of modern day justice administered by administrative agencies.”).
178. Honor Audit Commission: 2017–2018 Report, supra note 20, at 8, 11.
179. Honor Audit Commission: 2017–2018 Report, supra note 20, at 11.
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due process challenge. But assuming that courts continue to typically find or
assume that property or liberty interests are affected by an honor system
sanction, the more prudent approach for the schools would also to assume the
student has an individual interest, as well. This is not to minimize this article’s
proposal that the schools’ have latitude to truncate the processes designed to
protect those interests. Rather, it shifts the focus of the analysis to the Mathews
judicial test, which helps lend some balance to the equation.
2. Mathews Test (reprise)
Perhaps the best support for the notion that higher education institutions have
leeway to trim down the due process requirements within their honor systems
lies in the very test that was formulated to help determine the “specific dictates
of due process.” 180 This proposal invokes the Mathews test and is anchored in
three premises. First, court precedent indicates the balance between Mathews’
first and third prongs could easily tilt towards the interests of the institution,
particularly if schools ramp up their efforts in articulating those interests.
Second, if schools do not aggressively assert their interests within the Mathews
equation and courts consequently start consistently ruling against them, we
would be left in the unenviable position where the interests of higher education
are essentially eviscerated by court precedent. By default, this means that
educational interests would therefore be controlled and created by the courts.
Finally, if a stalemate persists between Mathews’ first and third prongs as
occurred in Butler, 181 the court history reviewed above reveals that schools are
currently faring well in terms of adequate processes. By default, a safe
assumption would be that more processes would be overkill. One could then
conclude that there are currently legal excesses that just have not been
“discovered.” Thus, it is high time for schools to find ways to streamline the
legal processes within their honor systems by finding and excising legal
excesses.
A good starting point for discussing the Mathews’ prongs would be the Butler
case. Recall that the Butler court notably emphasized the rights of the school,
Mathews’ third prong, after identifying the rights of the individual student,
Mathews first prong. 182 Indeed, the court felt that the school had an equal and
counterbalancing interest in “controlling the integrity of its graduate programs”
that essentially canceled out prongs one and three. 183 Mathews’ second prong,
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards,” would therefore be the controlling variable. 184 This prong, in itself,
180. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35.
181. Butler v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors of the Coll. of William & Mary, 121 Fed. App’x 515,
520 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
182. Butler, 121 F. App’x at 520 (per curiam).
183. Id.
184. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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evaluates the balance between what procedures the school is currently using and
the risk that these procedures would violate an individual’s due process rights.
A closer look at that balance counsels us that the interests of the school are a
pivotal component of the due process equation, and that the ball is often in the
school’s court when it comes to successfully defending against honor system
challenges.
First, higher educational institutions with well-established and revered honor
systems should not relent in asserting their interests into this equation. Much
like the Butler court proposed, higher educational institutions do have an interest
in protecting the integrity of their programs. In one respect, they are protecting
the integrity of their certifications granted upon a student’s graduation. That is,
a diploma is a school’s seal of approval that the graduate met or attained the
institution’s high standards. In the case of honor systems, the school certifies
that the individual student met the ethical and honorable standards of their
institution and, by extension, guarantees the graduate will thus act similarly in
their professional endeavors. That said, the certification loses meaning if what
it guarantees—graduates who have inculcated the school’s honor-seeking
reputation—applies to a lesser extent when the school allows the system it
employs to be diluted to ensure these attributes in favor of the rights of the
students.
Second, there are significant, though unintended, long-term perils associated
with schools failing to convincingly promote their own interests in preserving
effective honor systems. That is, by not consistently counterbalancing student’s
individual rights arguments, the schools will, by losing these cases in court, start
losing the ability to shape and maintain the integrity of their own honor systems
and codes. In these circumstances, the school’s honor codes will eventually
become more of a product of the courts, and less a reflection of what the
institutions desire to uphold. The good news for the institutions is that, to date,
that really has not happened given the relatively relaxed court dictates of “some
kind of notice” and “some kind of hearing.” 185 However, one can only be
pessimistic that the courts will remain as deferential as they have, given the laws
proclivity to “find” more and more fundamental rights and individual liberties
where they did not exist before, and a litigious society’s taking advantage of this
space in which the courts allow it to roam.
In short, schools should follow the Butler court’s lead and more vigorously
defend their interests in keeping their honor systems effective. A reduction of
legal processes would in turn reduce the inclination for a student to view the
system as something they can beat, rather than a code to which they should aspire
to adhere. Fostering such a positive honor climate would better achieve the
institutions ends’ as well as benefit the students they serve.

185. See Dutile, supra note 23, at 245.
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3. It’s a Contract: On My Honor . . .
Another perspective that could influence a school’s decision to abbreviate the
legal processes within its honor system is to consider the process as a form of a
contract. That is, if an institution treats its honor policy more as a contract
between the school and its students, the courts would be forced at least to
consider the contractual nature of the transaction, in addition to applying the
requisite due process review. While contractual principles are more of a
function of the private school relationship with its students, case precedent
supports infusing contractual principles into the public school-student
relationship. 186
Such a contractual perspective would, theoretically, make the school less
susceptible to successful legal challenge. This is because the defending school
would only need to show that its decision to dismiss a student, termination of
the contract, given the student’s breach by misconduct or failure to uphold the
contract’s provisions, was not “arbitrary and capricious.” 187 Indeed, this
contractual framework is the standard applied to most private institutions of
higher education when dealing with involuntary student dismissals. 188
In Judicial Review of Student Challenges to Academic Misconduct Sanctions,
Barbara A. Lee reviews several cases involving challenges to private schools’
procedures for academic misconduct dismissals. 189 Because of their private
186. See, e.g., Ross v. Pa. State Univ., 445 F. Supp. 147, 152, 155–56 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (“Thus,
this Court must decide whether Ross had a property interest under the law of Pennsylvania in
continuing his course of study as a graduate student at Penn State and in his employment as a
graduate student at that institution. Pennsylvania courts have long recognized that the relationship
between a student and a private college is contractual. As a result, students have been permitted to
bring contract actions against institutions of higher learning for alleged breaches of that contract.
The fact that Ross attended a public institution does not provide a sufficient basis for changing this
approach. A student has a reasonable expectation based on statements of policy by Penn State and
the experience of former students that if he performs the required work in a satisfactory manner
and pays his fees he will receive the degree he seeks.” (citations omitted)). Thus, students at public
institutions are afforded the benefits of both contractual and constitutional protections. See also
Jonathan Flagg Buchter, Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship, 48 IND. L.J. 253,
254 (1973) (“Courts still view the student-university relationship as one of contract with certain
constitutional protections required if the institution is public.”).
187. See, e.g., McCawley v. Universidad Carlos Albizu, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1257 (S.D.
Fla. 2006) (“Courts are generally reluctant to interfere with or substitute their judgment regarding
decisions of academic institutions to award degrees. Such decisions are afforded great deference
and are generally not disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”). After reiterating this common
theme, the court went on to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard in holding that the school’s
action was not improper in light of the student’s academic misconduct.
188. See Lee, supra note 37, at 527. Although Professor Lee’s discussion primarily centers
around a student’s contractual leverage to challenge a school sanction based on an academic
misconduct, the reverse could be said to be true if indeed there is a contractual relationship. That
is, the school could use contractual leverage to ensure a student adheres to the dictates of an honor
code, and would only be subject to constitutional challenge if its actions are deemed arbitrary and
capricious.
189. See id. at 528–30.
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status, these schools are normally held to principles of contract law when
evaluating such cases. 190 This generally requires schools to simply follow their
own processes, from a procedural standpoint, and that their decisions not be
arbitrary and capricious if the facts require an more in-depth substantive
review. 191 Lee summarizes this review by acknowledging that under contract
principles, private institutions of higher education fare exceptionally well when
faced with legal challenges. 192 She notes that some critique the blanket use of
contractual standards for both academic and academic misconduct cases at
private schools and the inherent disparity that creates between public and private
schools. 193 However, Lee points out that there is no corresponding dip in judicial
deference afforded to the public institutions that are required to apply the Gossguided due process standards in academic misconduct issues in comparison to
private universities who are not so required. 194
Though it is normally a private school privilege to treat academic misconduct
as contractual, some public schools adorn their honor systems with the trappings
of contract law by putting students on notice of honor violation consequences.
Consider this “pledge” read and signed by both applicants and newly
matriculating University of Virginia students.
I have read the explanation of the Honor System. I understand that as
a student at the University of Virginia, I will be participating in this
system. I agree to support and abide by the Honor System, which
prohibits lying, cheating, and stealing. I understand and accept that
the Honor System is administered entirely by student representatives,
including investigations, adjudications, and appeal review, and that
violations may result in permanent expulsion and revocation of any
University degree. 195
From another angle, consider the agreement newly matriculating cadets sign
within the first few hours of arriving at West Point.
II. Agreement to Serve
190. See id. at 527.
191. Id. at 530.
192. Id.
193. Lee, supra note 37, at 527–30.
194. See id.
195. See, e.g., Jane Kelly, Class of 2023 is Officially Welcomed to UVA at Opening
Convocation, UVA TODAY, (August 25, 2019), https://news.virginia.edu/content/class-2023officially-welcomed-uva-opening-convocation; Anne E. Bromley, Rite of Passage: First-Year
Students Join the Community of Trust, UVA TODAY (August 25, 2014), https://news.virginia.edu/
content/rite-pdassage-first-year-students-join-community-trust (describing how the pledge is
signed by newly matriculating students). Various University of Virginia courses require this pledge
on individual assignments: “On my honor, I pledge that I have neither given nor received help on
this assignment.” The Honor System, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF ENG’G & APPLIED SCI.,
https://engineering.virginia.edu/online/the-honor-system (last visited Jan. 20, 2021). More
complete information about the University of Virginia Honor System is available at the Honor
System website https://honor.virginia.edu/.
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I, having been appointed a cadet of the United States Military
Academy, do hereby agree, with the consent of my parents or guardian
if I am a minor:
a. To complete the course of instruction at the United States
Military Academy;
b. If tendered an appointment as a commissioned officer in
one of the armed services upon graduation from the United
States Military Academy, to accept such appointment and to
serve under such appointment on active duty for at least five
consecutive years immediately after such appointment; if
my initial appointment hereunder is in a Reserve
Component, to accept a commission in a Regular
Component if subsequently tendered during the five
consecutive years immediately after my initial appointment,
and to serve on active duty for the remainder of such period
under such appointment.
c. If I am permitted to resign my commission in a Regular
Component of one of the Armed Services prior to the eighth
anniversary of my graduation, to accept an appointment as a
commissioned officer in the Select Reserve (SELRES) of
one of the Armed Services and remain therein until such
eighth anniversary.
d. To serve a total of eight (8) years from graduation from
the United States Military Academy. Any part of that
service not completed on active duty must be served in the
SELRES (not on active duty), unless I am discharged from
the SELRES by proper military authority.
e. That if I fail to complete the course of instruction of the
United States Military Academy, breach my service
agreement as defined in paragraph 1.g.(3), Statement of
Policies on the next page, or decline to accept an
appointment as a commissioned officer, I will serve on
active duty as specified in paragraphs 1.b. through 1.g.,
which are contained in the Statement of Policies on the next
page;
f. That if I, as a result of misconduct, a volitional act or
omission, fail to complete the period of active duty specified
in paragraphs IIb, c, d or e above, I may be required to
reimburse the United States in an amount that bears the same
ratio to the total cost of advanced education provided me as
the unserved portion of active duty bears to the total period
of active duty I have agreed to serve;
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g. Further, that if I am separated from the United States
Military Academy for breach of this service agreement, as
defined in paragraph 1.g. (3), Statement of Policies on the
next page, and the Army decides that I should not be ordered
to active duty because such service would not be in the best
interests of the Army, I shall be considered to have either
voluntarily or because of misconduct failed to complete the
period of active duty and may be required to reimburse the
United States as described above;
h. For the purpose of this paragraph: (1) The term “volitional
act or omission” refers to an inability to meet any of the
standards prescribed in Chapter 6 of Army Regulation (AR)
210-26, United States Military Academy, to include, but not
limited to, conscientious objection, resignation from the
United States Military Academy or United States Army,
marriage or support obligation while a cadet, failure to meet
weight control program standards, and failure to meet Army
Physical Fitness Test standards. (2) The term “misconduct”
includes, but is not limited to, termination of my service by
the United States Army because of criminal conduct,
conduct violating the Cadet Honor Code, conduct deficiency
under the Cadet Disciplinary System, conduct violating the
provisions of AR 210-26, and conduct violating regulations
for the discipline of the Corps of Cadets. (3) The term
“course of instruction” is synonymous with the term
“educational requirements” as the term is used in 10 USC
2005. 196
To both the University of Virginia and the United States Military Academy,
their institutional standards are matters of profound importance. This is selfevident from the contracts provided above.
For the University of Virginia, new students are thus provided notice of the
school’s revered honor code before and upon entry. Not only does the pledge
provide early awareness of the University’s honor system, but it also summarizes
the consequences for failure to abide by the honor code. Presumably, the
University requires such a pledge by entering students to not only ensure their
awareness of the code, but to also leverage compliance. As such, it would be
difficult for a court not to acknowledge that the pledge is a type of contract.
Indeed, to earn what the University of Virginia will award you upon completion
of their program—a diploma that carries with it all of the prestige and qualitative
endorsement of the University—the University requires you to successfully
complete its regimen, a significant part of which is done while concurrently
196. See, e.g. USMA Form 5-50: USMA Post for Active Duty Service Obligation Contract,
UNITED STATES ARMY CAREER SATISFACTION (Mar. 2014), https://www.careersatisfaction.army.mil/resources/contracts/USMA-Post-Contract.pdf.
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abiding by the honor code. A classic bargained for exchange, memorialized by
the pledge.
For the United States Military Academy, the agreement to serve is, by its
terms, nothing short of a contract by the Academy as an agent of the Department
of Army and Department of Defense. It not only provides ample details about
consequences from not upholding the agreement, but refers to the specific
requirements of the Cadet Honor Code, Cadet Disciplinary System. It is indeed
a contract that requires successful completion of multiple components of the
Academy curriculum.. Failure to satisfactorily complete any of these programs
will prevent a cadet from earning a West Point diploma and receiving a
commission in the United States Army. It is quite difficult to imagine
misunderstanding or varying interpretation of these standards at either the
University of Virginia or the United States Military Academy, given the
straightforwardness of the language and contractual flavor of the University of
Virginia Honor Pledge and United States Military Academy Agreement to
Serve.
What does this all mean? For starters, applying a contractual legal template
to honor processes helps private institutions immunize themselves from honor
code legal challenges, especially when they follow their own procedures.
Second, institutions such as University of Virginia and the United States Military
Academy at West Point that require students to sign an honor pledge or an
agreement that includes adherence to an honor code most likely would have
standing to assert a contractual defense to such legal challenge. This defense
would be rooted in much more than just an implied contract theory: both
University of Virginia and the United States Military Academy at West Point
have a written contract in hand! Thus, even though both schools are indeed
public institutions, there is sufficient contractual nexus to their honor code
requirements such that the schools should not hesitate to assert contract
principles as a component of their defense, when challenged. It follows that this
contract law latitude is yet another component that gives these institutions space
to streamline the legal components within their honor systems.
VI. CONCLUSION
Does this article imply that students do not have due process rights when
sanctioned by an institute of higher education for violating their honor code?
Further, does this article recommend removing all legal protections in college
and university honor systems? The answer to these rhetorical questions is
obviously no. However, this article does suggest that some honor systems are
oversaturated with legal processes. This due process overcorrection could be a
result of a combination of factors, including the desire to steer far and away from
the systemic due process deficiencies of years past, and the morally correct
aspiration to insure students that the institutions have gone above and beyond in
preserving and protecting their constitutional rights.
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However noble these efforts, that does not mean that these honor systems have
been right-sized, legally. Based on their good track records in court, we know
that the schools’ honor systems are constitutionally sufficient. What we do not
know is exactly how much of the legal apparatus at each of these schools is
overkill. However, given the observations and legal philosophies discussed, it
is highly likely there are legal redundancies. Given that the “Due Process
Revolution” has not ended and will likely continue, the time is ripe for schools
to inspect their honor systems for legal oversaturation, excise any excess
processes, and resist the temptation to cave to the “revolution’s” pressure and
unnecessarily add legal components to their honor systems.
VII. RECOMMENDATION
One of the initial purposes of this article was to identify specific components
of educational honor systems that were excessive and recommend that those
institutions make appropriate adjustments. However, it became evident that
including such recommendations would exceed the scope in four ways. First, it
would take away from the more generally applicable focus of this article on
honor systems, writ large, and how the legal philosophy and court history
suggest there is institutional latitude to make adjustments. Second, given the
court history reviewed and the courts’ propensity, hopefully an enduring
propensity, to avoid legislating in the guise of mandating specific procedures,
there is little judicial guidance as to where these legal excesses may reside.
Third, such a school and process-specific study may be better suited for followon articles and studies, based on researched data and metrics. Finally, given the
variance in legal complexity amongst honor systems, this is not a one-size-fitsall situation. Some schools may find their honor systems are legally
oversaturated whereas others find theirs to be already right-sized. It is therefore
an institutional imperative to probe their own systems to determine what legal
processes may be excised while at the same time staying true to the constitutional
principles espoused by the courts.
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